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INTRODUCTION

She blinded me with science.
-Thomas Dolby'
Pity the molds.. For millennia, they have lived side-by-side with
humans, efficiently tidying up our environment, providing us with
nutrients, and even giving us penicillin, one of the most critical
elements in the unending battle against infectious disease.' Without
the molds, the human race would quickly succumb to disease and
death.' And yet today the molds are maligned more than ever;
blamed for ailments ranging from the benign to the life-threatening;
1. THOMAS DOLBY, She Blinded Me with Science, on GOLDEN AGE OF WIRELESS
(Capitol Records 1982).
2. See CONSTANTINE JOHN ALEXOPOULOS ET AL., INTRODUCTORY MYCOLOGY 514 (4th ed. 1996).
3. NICHOLAS P. MONEY, CARPET MONSTERS AND KILLER SPORES: A NATURAL
HISTORY OF TOXIC MOLD 21 (2004).
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cursed for destroying lifetimes of wealth; faulted for ruining
enormous man-made structures; cited as a threat to the viability of
human industry. Today, "toxic mold" is affixed into the layperson's
psyche alongside a cadre of other environmental concerns such as
asbestos, arsenic, and mercury. Common household sales involve
mold inspections-a rarity a decade ago.4 Homeowners that file
water damage claims typically face loss of insurance coverage and
severe difficulty in obtaining alternate coverage.5
Municipal
buildings, including dozens if not hundreds of schools, have been shut
down, and even destroyed, in response to mold concerns.6 Our
appreciation for the molds has evolved from one of curious respect to
outright fear and hostility.
Predictably, this evolution in our appreciation of the molds has
been accompanied by an onslaught of litigation.7
Salacious
4. Susan Ware, As Worries About Mold Grow, So Do Inspection Requests, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 28, 2003, at NW2.
5. See Karen E. Klein, Caught in a Storm, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2002, at K1.
Insurance coverage in virtually all states now specifically excludes mold-related claims or
charges significant additional fees for mold coverage. Motoko Rich, Nightmares on Mold
Street, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2003, at D1; Ware, supra note 4. The rising cost of mold
claims has been a significant financial burden for the insurance industry, causing it to
reduce or eliminate coverage in some states. Christopher Oster, Insurance Companies Just
Say 'No' to Covering Mold, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2002, at D1. Industry officials have
predicted that mold claims will also be financially crippling in North Carolina and have
asked for significant leeway to raise homeowners' insurance rates. See WRAL.com, Mold
Problems May Cause Insurance Rates To Rise in N.C., at http://www.wral.com/news/
2531272/detail.html (Oct. 23, 2003) (quoting representative of North Carolina Rate
Bureau: "We pretty much assumed that what happened in Texas was likely to occur in
North Carolina.") (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The North Carolina
Rate Bureau asked the state to allow homeowners' insurance rates to be raised fourteen
percent. Id. The North Carolina Rate Bureau also asked the North Carolina Department
of Insurance for a $5,000 cap on mold-related insurance claims. Allen Norwood, Insurers
Put Cap on Mold Payouts, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, July 27, 2002, at 1E. The cap was
approved in December 2001 and went into effect on May 1, 2002. Id. The tumult in the
insurance industry and the effect of mold on real estate transactions has been addressed
extensively and will not be the primary focus of this piece. See generally Walter G. Wright
Jr. & Stephanie M. Irby, The TransactionalChallenges Posed by Mold: Risk Management
and Allocation Issues, 56 ARK. L. REV. 295, 347-71 (2003) (discussing the effect of toxic
mold on real property transactions); D. Chris Harkins, Comment, The Writing Is on the
Wall.. . and Inside It: The Recent Explosion of Toxic Mold Litigation and the Insurance
Industry Response, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1101 (2002) (discussing the effect of mold
litigation on the insurance industry); Sylvia Pefia-Alfaro, Comment, The Toxic Mold
Terrifying Texas: Mold's Hold on the Insurance Industry, 34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 541 (2003)
(discussing the effect of mold litigation on the insurance industry).
6. See, e.g., David Pierson, Mold May Force Razing of Planned High School Site,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2002, at B3; WRAL.com, Mold Forces Closure of Durham Building, at
http://www.wral.com/news/2459430/detail.html (Sept. 5, 2003) (describing closure of
community center in Durham, N.C.) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
7. See Rich, supra note 5.
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allegations involving exotic species of molds that release toxins into

the air have piqued the interest of the media and the public. Great
fanfare has accompanied litigation involving famous celebrities pitted
against insurance companies and homebuilders.8 Eight-figure awards
have been realized in cases involving homeowners and workers
allegedly injured by toxic molds.'
Despite an absence of high-profile litigation, concern about the

public health impact of molds has been a concern in North Carolina.
Recent natural disasters such as Hurricane Floyd, which produced
devastating floods in eastern North Carolina, created ideal moisturerich conditions for mold proliferation." North Carolina Central
University in Durham experienced a mold infestation that led to the
closing of several dormitories and a major university library;"12
remediation costs have been estimated as high as $26 million.
Similar conditions have arisen at UNC-Pembroke and Duke
University. 3 Mold has also forced the closing of numerous county
schools.14 Even where the mold is of an innocuous variety, the

heightened concern over children's exposures and liability has led
8. For example, Ed McMahon, of television fame, received a multimillion dollar
settlement after he and his wife were driven from their California home by a mold
infestation so dangerous it allegedly led to the death of their dog, Muffin. Jean Guccione,
Ed McMahon Settles Suit over Mold for $7.2 Million, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 2003, at B1. Erin
Brokovich was also involved in litigation against the builder of her home. Andrew
LePage, Activist's New Fight Hits Home, SACRAMENTO BEE (California), Mar. 8, 2001, at
Dl.
9. See Centex-Rooney Constr. Co. v. Martin County, 706 So. 2d 20, 25 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1997) (per curiam) (affirming award of $14 million to a county in a breach of
contract lawsuit alleging that faulty design and construction of a county courthouse led to
an infestation of mold that sickened county employees); Allison v. Fire Ins. Exch., 98
S.W.3d 227, 237 (Tex. App. 2002) (describing the now infamous $33 million jury award
(much of which was reduced on appeal) won by Melinda Ballard and husband Ronald
Allison, of Dripping Springs, Texas, in their lawsuit against the insurer of their mansion
for failure to respond adequately to a toxic mold outbreak).
10. See Press Release, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services,
Public Health Officials Warn of Flooding's Delayed Dangers (Sept. 22, 1999),
http://www.dhhs.state.nc.us/pressrelU9-22-99b.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
11. See Vicki Cheng, Mold Plagues NCCU Library, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Aug. 13, 2003, at lA.
12. See Jane Stancill, UNC Board Wants $29 Million for Mold, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 14,2003, at 3B.
13. See id.; Mold on Books Closes Two Duke Library Floors, NEWS & RECORD
(Greensboro, N.C.), Nov. 2, 2002, High Point Edition, at B2.
14. See WRAL.com, Cumberland County Health Building, School Affected by Mold,
at http://www.wral.com/news/2662743/detail.html (Nov. 25, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); WRAL.com, Mold Problems Show Up at Bunn High School, at
http://www.wral.com/news/2526887/detail.html (Oct. 2, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
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school officials to take an expensive, but prudent, better-safe-thansorry approach. 5
This Comment focuses on the courts' treatment of mold personal
injury claims that are a frequent component of mold lawsuits. Much
speculation has occurred over the financial impact of these claims,
with many drawing comparisons to the archetypal modern-day toxic
tort action, the asbestos lawsuit. 6
The conclusion among
practitioners and academics is that mold injury claims are inherently
deficient because mold cannot be linked to specific adverse health
outcomes at identifiable exposure levels.17 And yet, a significant
number of lawsuits alleging mold-related injuries have reached a
successful conclusion for plaintiffs.
This Comment delves into the scientific merit of mold injury
claims and focuses on the treatment of causation evidence in recent
state and federal court decisions. To date, courts have exhibited
widely divergent reactions to such evidence, due in part to varying
tests of admissibility for scientific evidence, but also due to a growing
divide between the courts on the relevance and admissibility of
certain types of medical causation evidence, including differential
diagnosis. Much of the unease is due to the generality of symptoms
linked to non-toxigenic mold species and scientific uncertainty
surrounding the health effects of toxigenic molds. These are valid
concerns when determining whether a party to a toxic tort action has
met the burden of proving causation. However, recent court opinions
suggest that in their zeal to limit causation evidence, courts are
overreaching by assigning relevance to the absence of mold exposure
"standards."
Risk
management
exposure
standards
developed
by
governmental and regulatory agencies are not an appropriate proxy
15. Mold Problems Show Up at Bunn High School, supra note 14 (quoting local
school official after discovery of potentially toxic mold: "Mold isn't something to play
with.").
16. See, e.g., Thelma Jarman-Felstiner, Mold Is Gold: But, Will It Be the Next
Asbestos?, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 529, 551-52 (2003) (concluding that mold-related personal
injury claims likely will never reach the same magnitude as that seen in asbestos
litigation); Elizabeth L. Perry, Comment, Why Fear the Fungus?: Why Toxic Mold Is and
Is Not the Next Big Toxic Tort, 52 BuFF. L. REV. 257, 260 (2004) ("Due to the extremely

attenuated link between toxic mold growth and severe personal injury, it is unlikely that
mold litigation will reach the same level as that of notorious toxic torts like asbestos and
that of lead paint.").

17. See, e.g., Jarman-Felstiner, supra note 16, at 552 ("Unless more conclusive
scientific evidence is discovered to link toxic mold with specific, identifiable health
problems, the personal injury component of all mold claims will probably never reach the

level of asbestos litigation.").
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for scientifically documented threshold health effect levels in the
causation analysis. Risk management standards are not held to the
same standard of proof as evidence of causation, and they incorporate
additional considerations such as costs, technical feasibility, and
legislatively mandated safety factors. Empirically-based threshold
health effect values, in contrast, are derived directly from scientific
data, and thus provide more defensible evidence of causation. As
legislatures strive to develop the mold exposure "standards"
clamored for by the public and legal commentators, there is a distinct
risk that such guidelines will be misapplied by courts struggling to
identify general or specific causation in individual cases. Recent
decisions suggest that courts making complex evidentiary decisions
may be on the verge of doing just that.
Part I of this Comment presents background information on
molds, including toxigenic species such as Stachybotrys chartarum.
Part II provides a brief summary of mold litigation in the United
States, including an overview of a typical mold personal injury claim.
Part III examines how courts historically have dealt with personal
injury causation evidence in toxic tort cases generally. Part IV
discusses how the courts have reacted to such evidence in moldrelated litigation, and compares the courts' handling of mold-related
toxic tort claims to decisions involving other toxicants, focusing on
the courts' analyses of differential diagnosis evidence. Part IV also
focuses on the recent interest expressed by commentators and the
courts in "acceptable" exposure standards for mold, and highlights
the risks presented by relying on such information in legal causation
analysis.
I. MOLD AND HUMAN HEALTH

The molds are a ubiquitous and essential component of our
planet's biosphere that contribute to the orderly transformation of
dead and dying life forms into the simplest building blocks of life. 8
Molds are pervasive in both indoor and outdoor environments and
can survive under an astonishing range of environmental conditions.19

18. See INST. OF MED., DAMP INDOOR SPACES AND HEALTH 4 (2004) [hereinafter
IOMI (noting that molds consume dead and decaying organic matter), available at http://
www.nap.edu/books/0309091934/html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Am.

Coll. of Occupational & Envtl. Med., Adverse Human Health Effects Associated with
Molds in the Indoor Environment, 45 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 470, 470 (2004)

[hereinafter ACOEM Statement].
19. IOM, supra note 18, at 4; ACOEM Statement, supra note 18, at 470.
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Molds flourish indoors given appropriate levels of moisture.2" When
building structures become waterlogged during construction or
flooding, or experience chronic moisture problems as a result of
improper ventilation or construction deficiencies, mold colonies will
frequently develop in living or working quarters. 21 There are over
100,000 species of mold worldwide and over 1,000 different species
have been identified in homes in the United States.22 Indeed, the
prevalence of indoor molds was succinctly described by the Institute
23
of Medicine: "no indoor space is free of them.
The benefits of molds are many,24 but molds have also long been
known to cause adverse health effects in humans ranging from
allergic reactions 25 to infections 26 and overt toxicity, including

20. See D.M. Kuhn & M.A. Ghannoum, Indoor Mold, Toxigenic Fungi, and
Stachybotrys chartarum: Infectious Disease Perspective, 16 CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY
REV. 144, 145 (2003). Some species appear in virtually all damp indoor environments. See
id. (tabulating results from several indoor air studies). Penicillium molds were found in
ninety-six percent of damp buildings in one study of molds in domestic buildings. Id. at
145. Other species appear less frequently. Id. at 146 (reporting that in most studies the
toxigenic species Stachybotrys was found in less than three percent of dwellings). Some
commentators have suggested that the nutritional requirements for Stachybotrys growth
are not met by some common culturing techniques, leading to underreporting of
prevalence. See id. (theorizing that this phenomenon could explain underreporting in
early mold studies). Molds also multiply quickly under less humid conditions if provided
with warmer temperatures and suitable food sources. Id. at 145.
21. Occupational Safety and Health Admin., A Brief Guide to Mold in the Workplace
[hereinafter OSHA] (explaining that with adequate ventilation and low moisture levels,
the establishment and growth of mold colonies can easily be avoided), at http://www.osha.
gov/dts/shib/shibl01003.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
22. See Mold: A Growing Problem: Joint Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations and the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity of the
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 57 (2002) (statement of Stephen C. Redd, M.D., Chief,
Air Pollution and Respiratory Health Branch, National Center for Environmental Health,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) [hereinafter Redd] (Sup. Docs. No.
Y4.F49/20:107-77), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/107-77.pdf (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review); OSHA, supra note 21.
23. IOM, supra note 18, at 4.
24. See, e.g., Nobelprize.org, The Discovery of Penicillin, at http://www.nobel.se/
medicine/educational/penicillin/readmore.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2004) (describing
Alexander Fleming's surreptitious discovery that Penicillium notatum mold secreted an
antibacterial substance leading to the development of the antibiotic penicillin, which has
saved millions of lives) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
25. See ACOEM Statement, supra note 18, at 470-72 (describing allergic and other
hypersensitivity reactions to indoor molds).
26. Life-threatening fungal infections arising from mold exposure are observed in a
limited number of circumstances. See IOM, supra note 18, at 235-37. These infections
primarily affect people with weakened immune systems, such as cancer patients receiving
chemotherapy and persons suffering from AIDS. See ACOEM Statement, supra note 18,
at 472. More common infections include superficial fungal infections of the skin and nails,
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cancer.27 Allergic reactions to mold are the most commonly observed
health effect. Approximately ten percent of the human population
has allergic antibodies that will specifically recognize and react to the

uasihl inhale
r occurs
cuswe
when humans
presence of mold proteins. 28 Exposure
airborne mold spores or hyphal fragments, which deposit on the

surface of the airways, often triggering an allergic response.2 9
Typically, allergic reactions are relatively benign and manifest as

sinus irritation, hay fever, or asthma.3"

However, more serious

allergic effects have been documented at elevated exposure levels3 or

in highly sensitized individuals exposed to moderate mold levels.32
Molds are the most important biological contributor to "sick building
syndrome," which describes the symptoms suffered by individuals in
unhealthful indoor work or home environments.33 A recent Mayo

Clinic study concluded that the chronic sinus problems experienced
by thirty-seven million Americans are largely the result of exposure
to molds.34

There is an entire subset of health effects that arise from
exposure to chemical toxins, known as mycotoxins, released by
which are widely prevalent in the human population. Id. at 473. The CDC has estimated
that up to nine percent of hospital-acquired infections are caused by fungi. See Redd,
supra note 22, at 8.
27. Toxic endpoints, including respiratory tissue damage and nervous system
impairment, have been observed in humans and animals exposed to toxigenic mold
species. See IOM, supra note 18, at 125-82. Some mold toxins have even been linked to
the development of human cancer. Redd, supra note 22, at 59 (referring to the
carcinogenic mycotoxins aflatoxin (from peanut molds) and ochratoxin A (from species of
Penicilliumand Aspergillus found in cereal grains)); 1OM, supra note 18, at 166-70.
28. See ACOEM Statement, supra note 18, at 471. It is further estimated that perhaps
one-half of these persons will have experienced allergic symptoms arising from mold
exposure. Id.
29. Id. at 471; IOM, supra note 18, at 92. Hyphal fragments are microscopic filaments
comprised of the fungal cells that make up mold colonies. ACOEM Statement, supra note
18, at 470.
30. See ACOEM Statement, supra note 18, at 470-72.
31. See id. (describing "[a] rare, but much more serious immune-related condition,
hypersensitivity pneumonitis" and other even more rare conditions including allergic
bronchopulmonary aspergillosis and allergic fungal sinusitis).
32. See id. at 471 (explaining that an individual's "profile of allergic sensitivity"
influences an individual's allergic airway disease).
33. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Children's Health Initiative: Toxic Mold, at
http://www.epa.gov/appcdwww/iemb/child.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2004) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). Sick building syndrome is an umbrella term that describes
"a combination of nonspecific symptoms related to residence or work in a particular
building." 1OM, supra note 18, at 250. Symptoms most frequently include fatigue,
headache, and irritation of the eyes, nose, or throat; however, studies describing sick
building syndrome often vary in the requirements for the nature of symptoms. Id.
34. See Seema Mehta, Mold Quickly Spreads as Health and Legal Issue, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 2001, at B3.
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toxigenic species of mold.
These mycotoxins, which may have
evolved as a defense mechanism to combat other microorganisms,

insects, or animals,36 rank among the most potent toxins known to
man.3 Human exposure occurs following ingestion of moldy foods,
direct contact with the skin, or inhalation exposure to dust, mold
spores, or hyphal fragments carrying mycotoxins. s A small number
of occupational diseases have been linked to inhalation exposure to

high levels of airborne toxigenic molds, primarily in industrial and
agricultural occupations.3 9

Most of the recent research into mold and mycotoxin exposure
has focused on inhalation exposures to mold in the indoor
environment. 40 Numerous studies have suggested an association
between home dampness and respiratory complaints,4" although the

causal relationship behind these associations remains unclear.42 In
recent years, a small number of controversial studies linked indoor

35. See Kuhn & Ghannoum, supra note 20, at 149-55. Mycotoxins are metabolites
that are most frequently produced under "suboptimal growth conditions." Id. at 150.
36. See Ruth A. Etzel, Mycotoxins, 287 JAMA 425, 425 (2002).
37. For example, aflatoxin, produced by the peanut mold Aspergillus flavus, is one of
only a handful of chemicals which has been definitively linked to human cancer.
Populations with significant exposure to aflatoxin suffer from unusually high levels of
hemangiosarcoma, a form of liver cancer. For a thorough account of the discovery and
characterization

of aflatoxin,

see

JOSEPH

A.

RODRICKS,

CALCULATED

RISKS:

UNDERSTANDING THE TOXICITY AND HUMAN HEALTH RISKS OF CHEMICALS IN OUR

ENVIRONMENT xvii-xxv (1994).
38. ACOEM Statement, supra note 18, at 473. Several notable disease outbreaks in
human populations have been attributed to the consumption of foods contaminated by
molds and mold toxins. See Kuhn & Ghannoum, supra note 20, at 150 (describing an
outbreak of disease in the Middle Ages involving joint pain, hallucinations, and gangrene
that arose from consumption of moldy rye and came to be known as "St. Anthony's
Fire").
39. See Redd, supra note 22, at 59-60 (describing a variety of conditions including
farmer's lung, malt worker's lung, and respiratory tract injuries caused by exposure to
moldy hay and barley dust containing mold spores).
40. See generally IOM, supra note 18, at 90-110 (discussing methods for assessing
exposure to indoor agents, including molds and mycotoxins).
41. See Bert Brunekreef et al., Home Dampness and Respiratory Morbidity in
Children, 140 AM. REV. RESPIRATORY DISEASE 1363, 1363 (1989); Robert E. Dales et al.,
Respiratory Health Effects of Home Dampness and Molds Among CanadianChildren, 134
AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 196, 196 (1991); see also IOM, supra note 18, at 183-269 (assessing
numerous studies purporting to show a link between damp indoor spaces and adverse
health outcomes); Kuhn & Ghannoum, supra note 20, at 145 (summarizing several recent
studies of indoor environments).
42. Kuhn & Ghannoum, supra note 20, at 145, 149 (explaining that concomitant
exposure to volatile organic chemicals, bacteria, and other allergens, including dust mites,
confounds the establishment of a clear causal connection and noting that most authors
reporting ill effects related to Stachybotrys exposure are reporting "associations rather
than proof of causation").
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toxigenic molds, including Stachybotrys chartarum, to illnesses in
These studies
workers43 and pulmonary hemorrhage in infants.'
45
alarmed the public health community and triggered investigations
by several government agencies. 46 Generally, independent review
bodies have backed away from the most troubling of the studies'
conclusions, advising government agencies to adopt the position that
the current science does not support a causal link between exposure
to Stachybotrys and lung injury in infants.4 7
Nevertheless, public anxiety about Stachybotrys and other socalled "toxic molds" exploded in the years following release of the
earliest toxic mold studies.4 8 Suddenly, indoor molds became the
cause of an increasingly terrifying laundry list of adverse health
High-profile litigation, particularly involving celebrity
effects. 49
plaintiffs, was covered widely in the popular press.50 Several cases
ended with enormous payouts to plaintiffs complaining of brain
damage and serious respiratory damage stemming from residential
toxic mold exposure.5 1
43. See Eckardt Johanning et al., Health and Immunology Study Following Exposure
to Toxigenic Fungi (Stachybotrys chartarum) in a Water-Damaged Office Environment, 68
INT'L ARCHIVES OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 207,207-08 (1996).
Pulmonary
Update:
44. Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention,
Hemorrhage/HemosiderosisAmong Infants-Cleveland, Ohio, 1993-1996, 46 MMWR:
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 33-35 (1997).
45. See Frederick Fung et al., Stachybotrys: A Mycotoxin-Producing Fungus of
Increasing Toxicologic Importance, 36 CLINICAL TOXICOLOGY 79, 84 (1998).
46. See, e.g., Redd, supra note 22, at 8-9 (describing the CDC's efforts to understand
the health effects of toxigenic molds); CDC WORKING GROUP ON PULMONARY
HEMOSIDEROSIS,

REPORT

OF

CDC

WORKING

GROUP

ON

PULMONARY

HEMORRHAGE/HEMOSIDEROSIS (1999) [hereinafter CDC] (reviewing epidemiological
studies and advising the CDC to address unresolved questions about the Chicago and
Cleveland infant studies), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/airpollution/mold/
hemorrhage-report.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency is also working towards defining the optimal growth
conditions for molds in the indoor environment. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note
33.
47. See CDC, supra note 46, at 5 ("CDC should adopt the official position that the
epidemiologic evidence does not provide strong support for the association of S. atra or
other toxigenic fungi with [pulmonary hemorrhage and related conditions in infants].").
The Institute of Medicine concluded that the role of Stachybotrys in the Cleveland cluster
is "controversial" and that available studies provide "inadequate or insufficient
information" to determine whether an association exists between acute idiopathic
pulmonary hemorrhage and Stachybotrys in the indoor environment. IOM, supra note 18,
at 242-43.
48. See Anita Hamilton, Beware: Toxic Mold, TIME, July 2, 2001, at 54, 54-55.
49. See id.
50. See, e.g., Guccione, supra note 8 (describing lawsuits involving Ed McMahon and
Erin Brokovich).
51. See id. (describing multimillion dollar verdicts won in Texas and California mold
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As mold spread across the legal landscape of the late 1990s and

early 2000s, researchers have continued to pursue evidence of a
causal relationship between mold exposure and adverse health
outcomes. Recent studies have greatly advanced our knowledge of
human health effects associated with exposure to indoor molds,
routes of human exposure, sampling methods for molds, and the

pervasiveness
Stachybotrys

of the most suspect toxigenic molds, especially
2

Many scientists have distanced themselves from the

most sensational claims regarding exposure to toxigenic molds. 3
Nevertheless, indoor molds are considered responsible for a wide
array of adverse health outcomes, many of which are general in
nature and difficult to trace back to a single causative agent.5 4 The

wide range of symptoms and uncertainty concerning ill effects from
toxigenic molds present a daunting challenge for scientists and legal
professionals striving to establish a causative link between exposure
to toxigenic mold and human illness.
II. THE RECENT UPSURGE IN MOLD LITIGATION
As many as ten thousand mold-related lawsuits have been filed
in the United States within the last decade,55 a huge increase over the
period prior to the mid-1990s when lawsuits involving mold appeared
only sporadically.5 6 Theories for the recent surge in lawsuits include a
lawsuits). The Texas litigation included allegations that toxic mold exposure caused toxic
encephalopathy, a brain disease. Allison v. Fire Ins. Exch., 98 S.W.3d 227, 240 (Tex. App.
2002).
52. See IOM, supra note 18, at 183-269 (reporting findings from numerous recent
scientific publications); Kuhn & Ghannoum, supra note 20, at 149-50 (summarizing recent
developments in health effects research for indoor toxigenic molds such as Stachybotrys).
53. See, e.g., ACOEM Statement, supra note 18, at 476 ("Current scientific evidence
does not support the proposition that human health has been adversely affected by
inhaled mycotoxins .... ).
54. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
55. Barbara Anderson, Risks, Lawsuits Linked to Household Mold Are Growing,
FRESNO BEE (California), Jan. 3, 2004, http://www.modbee.com/local/story/7959687p8833528c.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
56. An electronic search of state and federal case law from prior to 1995 reveals a
relatively small number of cases; most of these claims did not specifically allege injurious
exposure to toxigenic molds. See, e.g., Miller v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass'n, 2 Cal. Rptr.
2d 796, 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (alleging that condominium association's negligent failure
to repair and maintain plumbing system led to tenant's exposure to mold, causing asthma
symptoms); Komatsu v. Bd. of Trs., 693 P.2d 405, 412 (Haw. 1984) (awarding disability
benefits to employee suffering asthmatic bronchitis as a result of exposure to mold emitted
from a defective air conditioning system); Washington Courte Condo. Ass'n v.
Washington-Golf Corp., 501 N.E.2d 1290, 1293 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (alleging negligent
installation of windows and exterior doors led to allergic reaction in child exposed to
resulting mold infestation). One of the first appellate court decisions involving a toxigenic
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greater understanding of the causal connection between molds and
adverse health outcomes," greater actual exposure resulting in part
from new construction materials and standards,5 8 greater attention
being paid to the issue by the public through mass media
60
consumption,5 9 and opportunistic plaintiffs' lawyers.
A.

Mold-related Causes of Action

Although toxic mold-related lawsuits are a relatively new
phenomenon, the claims being brought are generally founded on
well-settled law.6' Many of these lawsuits are filed by tenants, office
workers, or homebuyers against landlords, construction companies, or
mold species was Centex-Rooney Construction Co. v. Martin County, 706 So. 2d 20 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam). The court in Centex-Rooney affirmed the trial court's
award to Martin County in a lawsuit for breach of contract regarding a courthouse that
became infested with numerous mold species. Id. at 29.
57. Anderson, supra note 55 (noting the position of lawyers and advocates for
homeowners that more lawsuits are being filed because people are better educated about
mold risks).
58. See id. (suggesting that new home construction practices used today create
optimal conditions for mold growth). The role of construction practices or energy efficient
construction standards is much more controversial. Some have asserted that airtight
houses prevent the ventilation that is key to reducing moisture buildup and mold growth.
See Deborah K. Dietsch, Exorcising a Mold Monster, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2002, at H1
(contrasting a remediation company executive's view that energy-efficient homes are an
"ideal environment for mold" with those of a homebuilders' association representative
that "there is no clear evidence that newer homes have more mold than older homes").
Others have pointed to newer, inexpensive construction materials as a contributing factor.
For example, cellulose insulation materials and plaster board used in newer homes retain
moisture and may contribute to mold growth. Anderson, supra note 55; see also Kuhn &
Ghannoum, supra note 20, at 146 (suggesting that Stachybotrys's "fondness" for cellulose
may explain its appearance in buildings). It has even been suggested that the residential
building boom of the 1990s contributed to the problem as builders were hastily assembling
houses with materials that became wet at the construction site. Rich, supra note 5. Still,
assigning all the blame on energy efficient home construction standards is unsupportable,
since these standards have been in place since the energy crisis of the 1970s, see Wright &
Irby, supra note 5, at 309-10, while the exponential rise in lawsuits and insurance claims
has been confined to the past five to ten years. See Rich, supra note 5 (noting that moldrelated insurance payouts rose from near zero in 1999 to $3 billion by 2002).
59. See Mary Umberger, The Star that Upstaged the Economy, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 13,
2002, § 16, at 1 (describing how insurance industry representatives blame a "coordinated
media campaign" for public concern about indoor molds).
60. See Anderson, supra note 55 ("[L]awyers for builders, subcontractors and
landlords say modern construction isn't at fault. They refer to a 'mold is gold'
phenomenon, claiming publicity about multimillion-dollar settlements is an incentive for
people to sue."); see also Thomas Grillo, After 8 Years, a Milestone in Battle over Mold,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 25, 2003, at Al ("[O]pponents of toxic mold litigation say the

claims stem from greedy lawyers looking for the next cash cow as asbestos lawsuits
diminish.").
61. Erin Masson Wirth, Annotation, Toxic Mold in Residences and Other Buildings:
Liability and Other Issues, 114 A.L.R.5th 397, 408-09 (2003).

2005]

THE SAME MOLD STORY?

home sellers. Claims include breach of contract, breach of duty of
good faith and fair dealing, failure to warn, negligence, unfair and
deceptive trade practices, and breach of implied warranty of
habitability.62 A typical claim involves an allegation that negligent

construction practices or improper maintenance of a rental unit
resulted in a mold infestation that sickened residents.6 3
The largest number of mold-related lawsuits have been directed

against homeowners' insurance companies for refusing to recognize
mold-related insurance claims. 64 Many of these lawsuits incorporate
claims of bad faith, which permit recovery of punitive damages. 65
Juries have handed down multimillion dollar awards in lawsuits

against insurance companies, 66 attracting the attention of the

62. Id. See, e.g., RCDI Constr., Inc. v. Space/Architecture Planning & Interiors, P.A.,
No. 01-1676, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 640, at *3-*6 (4th Cir. Jan. 15, 2002) (per curiam)
(upholding dismissal of unfair trade practices claim filed against architectural firm that
advised owners of mold-infested building to terminate their contractors); Roche v. Lincoln
Prop. Co., 278 F. Supp. 2d 744, 746 (E.D. Va. 2003) (claiming landlord negligently failed to
maintain apartment), summary judgment granted, No. 02-1390-A, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23353 (E.D. Va. July 25, 2003), vacated on other grounds, 373 F.3d 610 (4th Cir. 2004);
Caldwell v. Curioni, 125 S.W.3d 784, 788 (Tex. App. 2004) (reversing summary judgment
for landlord on claim of breach of duty to inform tenants of mold infestation); Gifford v.
Matejka, No. 25886-2-11, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 1560, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. July 20,
2001) (involving allegation that landlord's agent failed to represent the true condition of
the residence).
63. For example, in 1997 the Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed a $14 million
judgment against a construction company for breach of contract in design and construction
of a county courthouse. Centex-Rooney Constr. Co. v. Martin County, 706 So. 2d 20, 29
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam). Window and exterior wall leaks led to an
infestation of toxigenic mold that sickened numerous court employees, including several
judges. Id. at 24. The court found that the plaintiffs successfully "proved that Centex's
construction defects caused moisture problems in the buildings, resulting in extensive
mold growth." Id. at 25. The county was awarded over $11 million in damages. Id. at 28.
64. See Umberger, supra note 59 (citing insurance industry statistics estimating that
approximately half of the recent lawsuits have been directed against insurance
companies).
65. See id.; R.J. Maniloff, Mold: The Hysteria Among Us: Exposure to Mold Causes
Bad Faith Claims Against Insurers, 16 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: INS. BAD FAITH, No. 13,
Nov. 6, 2002, at 1. In the typical mold-related bad faith claim, a homeowner alleges that
her homeowner's insurance company refused to repair a covered defect in the home that
contributed to mold proliferation, or refused to repair mold-related damage to the home.
The elements of a typical bad faith claim require that the insured prove that the insurer
"acted in bad faith by refusing to settle or negotiate with the plaintiff and that the insurers'
[sic] actions have been a misuse of power and authority tantamount to outrageous conduct
reflecting a reckless and wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights under the insurance
policy." Johnson v. First Union Corp., 128 N.C. App. 450, 457, 496 S.E.2d 1, 6 (1998)
(reciting the elements of a bad faith claim in North Carolina).
66. See Allison v. Fire Ins. Exch., 98 S.W.3d 227, 234-37 (Tex. App. 2002) (discussing
the jury's award of over $33 million against an insurance company).
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plaintiffs' bar and sending a shudder through the insurance industry.67

Perhaps the most infamous of the mold-related bad-faith claims
(and arguably the most infamous mold-related case bar none) is
Allison v. Fire Insurance Exchange.68 In Allison, Melinda Ballard and

husband Ronald Allison, of Dripping Springs, Texas, suffered a series
of leaks that led to extensive water damage inside their home.69 After

filing several claims against their insurance provider, they eventually
resorted to filing a lawsuit, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and
breach of duty of good faith.7" The jury eventually awarded the

couple over $33 million, including $12 million in punitive damages. 7
On review, the Texas Court of Appeals considered several of the
alleged acts, including specific instances of misrepresentation,72
73
unnecessary extensions of time to complete the claim investigation,

refusal of prompt payment, and fraudulent bids.74 Citing evidence of
the claim processor's lack of authority and experience and the
extension of the claim investigation well beyond the determination of
liability, the court held there was sufficient evidence to support the
jury's finding of bad faith.7 5 Notably, however, the court reversed the

punitive damages award,76 finding no basis for claims of fraud,
unconscionable conduct or involvement in deceptive business
practices.77

67. See Oster, supra note 5.
68. 98 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. App. 2002).
69. Id. at 234-37 (describing the background of the case).
70. Id. at 236.
71. Id. at 237.
72. See id. at 245 (reviewing the allegation that insurance company representatives
misrepresented that complete plumbing tests were performed).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 250.
76. Id. at 258.
77. Id. at 257-58. Insurance companies have enacted measures to limit their potential
liability from mold-related claims, such as refusing to issue policies on homes that have
suffered recent water damage and dropping policy holders after a single water damage
claim. Oster, supra note 5. In some states, the insurance lobby has successfully pushed for
legislative limits on mold-related damages. See Mold Problems May Cause Insurance
Rates To Rise in N.C., supra note 5 (quoting North Carolina Rate Bureau officials and
citing a $5,000 cap for homeowners' insurance claims related to mold). Still, payouts are
expected to continue into the foreseeable future as insurance companies, builders, and
property owners battle over who should take responsibility for mold-related property
damage. See Rich, supra note 5. The above cases only scratch the surface of the realm of
mold-related property law claims. For recent comprehensive reviews on the matter of
liability between insurance companies, builders, and homeowners, see generally Wright &
Irby, supra note 5 (discussing the effect of mold on real estate transactions and potential
means for addressing those challenges); Mike Bischoff, Comment, Theories of Toxic Mold
Liability Facing Arizona Homebuilders,34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681 (2002).
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Mold PersonalInjury Claims

Although Melinda Ballard prevailed on several claims against
her insurance carrier, her husband, Ronald Allison, ultimately failed
to convince the court on the merit of his personal injury claims.7 8 His
claims were certainly extraordinary. Allison contended that his
exposure to Stachybotrys caused a host of ailments, including toxic
encephalopathy-a degenerative disease of the brain. 79 However,
prior to trial the district court granted the defendant's motion to
exclude expert testimony that linked Allison's condition to
Stachybotrys exposure, g0 and subsequently granted partial summary
81
judgment to the defendants on these claims for lack of evidence.
2
These decisions were ultimately upheld on appeal.
Allison illustrates a frequently encountered outcome in moldrelated litigation: success on claims involving contract or property
law principles, and a lack of success on personal injury claims.8 3 Mold
plaintiffs face substantial challenges in bringing forth personal injury
claims. Courts insist on specificity and reliability of evidence linking
mold exposure to health effects, and yet very few agents give rise to a
greater range of health effects than the molds. The claims reflect this
diversity: Ed McMahon complained of chronic coughing, sneezing,
and congestion;8" Erin Brokovich's lawsuit against the builder and
former owner of her home claimed exposure to mold caused
respiratory ailments, facial rashes, sinus infections, and frequent
Many other cases involve complaints of allergic
headaches.
reactions, including aggravation of asthma, hypersensitivity to odors,
and difficulty breathing.8 6 Invariably, additional and more general
78. Allison, 98 S.W.3d at 240.
79. See id. at 239.
80. Id. at 237 (describing the district court's exclusion of testimony on the grounds
about the
that "[Allison's] expert witnesses did not have reliable epidemiological studies
1
health effects of exposure to mold").
81. Id. at 240. The evidence that Allison submitted as proof of causation as to his
conditions is discussed in Part IV.A., infra.
82. Id. at 239-40.
83. See Grillo, supra note 60 (quoting the editor of Massachusetts Lawyer Weekly:
"It's easy to prove that mold messed up your home but a lot harder to prove it messed up
your body.").
84. Guccione, supra note 8 (describing the events leading up to the McMahon's
lawsuit against their homeowner's insurance provider).
85. LePage, supra note 8.
86. See, e.g., Roche v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 278 F. Supp. 2d 744, 746 (E.D. Va. 2003)
(listing hypersensitivity to smells and shortness of breath among their symptoms),
summary judgment granted, No. 02-1390-A, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23353 (E.D. Va. July

25, 2003), vacated on other grounds, 373 F.3d 610 (4th Cir. 2004); Miller v. Lakeside Vill.
Condo. Ass'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (alleging severe allergic

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

symptoms such as fatigue, headaches, and body pain appear.87 In one
case, a plaintiff even claimed that exposure to mold was a "promoter

and substantial contributing factor" to the88 development of cancer
following concomitant exposure to asbestos.
More serious health effects have been attributed to the toxigenic
molds.

Allison complained that exposure to Stachybotrys caused

neurological impairment including memory loss, inability to
concentrate, and toxic encephalopathy.89 Similar symptoms were
described by the plaintiffs in Roche v. Lincoln Property, Co.," whose
apartment was found to contain several molds, including
92 the plaintiffs experienced
Stachybotrys.91 In Caldwell v. Curioni,
headaches, fever, diarrhea, severe nausea, and vomiting within a
week of moving into a house contaminated with Stachybotrys.93

The personal injury claims are an important part of the plaintiff's
case because they can give rise to large damage awards.94 But thus
far, plaintiffs have had mixed results with mold-related personal

injury claims. The divergent outcomes observed in these cases reflect
the complexity of the allegations, the effect of evolving scientific

evidence, and the trepidation of courts making
determinations regarding evidentiary admissibility.

difficult

III. ToxIc TORTS AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF CAUSATION
EVIDENCE

Toxic mold personal injury claims are simply a unique form of
reactions and asthma attacks).
87. See, e.g., New Haverford P'ship v. Stroot, 772 A.2d 792, 796 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001)
(noting claims of these symptoms in addition to asthma attacks and other allergic reactions
including sinus problems).
88. See Watters v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 849 So. 2d 724, 731-33 (La. Ct. App. 2003)
(finding genuine issue of material fact in the plaintiff's expert testimony that mold
exposure compromised his immune system, weakening his defenses against malignancy).
89. Allison v. Fire Ins. Exch., 98 S.W.3d 227, 239 (Tex. App. 2002).
90. 278 F. Supp. 2d 744,746 (E.D. Va. 2003), summary judgment granted,No. 02-1390A, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23353 (E.D. Va. July 25, 2003), vacated on other grounds, 373
F.3d 610 (4th Cir. 2004).
91. Id. at 755.
92. 125 S.W.3d 784, 788 (Tex. App. 2004).
93. Id. at 788.
94. For example, in New Haven Partnershipv. Stroot, 772 A.2d 792 (Del. Super. Ct.
2001), a jury awarded the plaintiffs over $1 million for medical expenses, permanent
impairment, and pain and suffering. Id. at 801. More recently, a condominium owner was
awarded $285,000 for flu-like symptoms arising from a mold infestation caused by her
landlord's negligent failure to repair a leak in the basement of her unit. Grillo, supra note
60 (reading the condominium owner's case as "send[ing] a message that it's possible to
link" mold exposure to adverse health effects).
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toxic tort action. In a typical toxic tort action, the plaintiff alleges that
the defendant caused or threatened to cause the plaintiff to be
exposed to a toxic agent, resulting in a compensable injury." The
burden of proving causation is a weighty one for the plaintiff. The
plaintiff must show that the toxicant in question is capable of causing
the injury complained of (general causation) and must further prove
that the toxicant in fact did cause that injury in the present case
As we will see, there ar6 often pointed
(specific causation).
disagreements over issues such as whether and to what extent the
plaintiff was actually exposed, and what evidence exists to support the
determination that the offending substance was in fact "toxic" at the
plaintiff's level of exposure. 7 In addition, the plaintiff must also rule
out other potential causes of the same injury.98 Every link in the
causal chain is susceptible to attack by the opposing party. 99
A.

EvidentiaryHurdlesfor the Toxic Tort Plaintiff

For environmental agents such as the molds, the plaintiff's
burden of proving injurious exposure is often profoundly difficult.
Movement of a toxicant from a source to a human receptor is nearly
impossible to accurately predict given the overwhelming number of
environmental variables to consider.1" In addition, many toxic agents
are metabolized and excreted quickly by the exposed individual,
precluding any opportunity to provide definitive evidence of exposure
Finally, the appearance of
through medical examinations." 1
symptoms such as cancer and chronic organ toxicity may be delayed
This delay introduces
until many years following exposure. 1"
numerous challenges for the plaintiff, including the possibility of
intervening exposures and the need to reconstruct exposure from
decades-old data of questionable quality.1 3 Because exposures are
95. See JEAN MACCHIAROLI EGGEN, Toxic TORTS IN A NUTSHELL 2 (2d ed. 2000).

96. In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1224 (D. Colo. 1998); see Stephen
J. Henning & Daniel A. Berman, A Mold Claims Primer: Microbial ContaminationIssues,
33 BRIEF 22, 31-32 (2003).
97. See Henning & Berman, supra note 96, at 31-32.
98. See SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR:
TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA 119 (1995).

LAW,

SCIENCE,

AND

99. See id. (explaining that most attacks occur where there are "disagreements among
relevant communities of experts").
100. See RODRICKS, supra note 37, at 12-24 (describing "a process of staggering
complexity and beauty").
101. See id. at 25-37 (providing an overview of the process of absorption, distribution,
metabolism, and excretion of chemicals by the human body).
102. See EGGEN, supra note 95, at 5-6.
103. See id. at 6-7.
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frequently fleeting and unpredictable events, accurate quantification

of risk is nearly impossible." Exposure evidence is therefore highly
susceptible to accusations of unreliability.
Proving the particular level of exposure at which an agent like
mold would be expected to give rise to adverse health effects is also

difficult. Most substances cannot be characterized as toxic per se
because they only manifest toxicity above a certain threshold level of
exposure. 105 Determining the relevant threshold health effect level is

one of the most heated issues in toxic tort litigation. Disagreements
may arise over the quality of data supporting the determination, the
use of the data to extrapolate to "safe" or no-effect exposure levels,
and even the relevance of a particular health outcome.0 6 Toxicity

assessment'017 commonly involves relying on toxicological data from
animal studies. 10 8 Interpreting how such results should apply to the

assessment of human health risk involves making several inferential
leaps-all of which are subject to debate.0 9 Epidemiological studies
104. See Elaine M. Faustman & Gilbert S. Omenn, Risk Assessment, in CASARETr &
DOULL'S TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 83, 97 (Curtis D. Klaassen ed.,

6th ed. 2001) (explaining that exposure assessment is the most uncertain parameter in risk
assessment).
105. Paracelsus (1493-1591) is often credited with issuing the mantra of toxicology:
"What is there that is not poison? All things are poison and nothing [is] without poison.
Solely the dose determines that a thing is not a poison." David L. Eaton & Curtis D.
Klaassen, Principles of Toxicology, in CASARETT & DOULL'S TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC

SCIENCE OF POISONS 11, 13 (Curtis D. Klaassen ed., 6th ed. 2001).
106. For example, not all experts will agree as to whether certain health outcomes can
be characterized as evidence of toxicity. Some ailments, such as headaches, body pain, or
nausea, incorporate elements of subjectiveness; toxicological endpoints generally consist
of quantifiable endpoints such as tumor incidence or observable tissue damage.
107. Toxicity assessment is the component of the traditional risk assessment process
which incorporates hazard identification (involving "a description of the specific forms of
toxicity ... that can be caused by a chemical and an evaluation of the conditions under
which these forms of toxicity might appear in exposed humans") and dose-response
assessment (an examination of the expected quantitative relationship between dose of
exposure and toxicity in exposed humans)... COMM. ON RISK ASSESSMENT OF
HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT

IN RISK ASSESSMENT 56 (1994). Combined with an exposure assessment, this information
is used to characterize risks in the human population. Id. at 68.
108. See generally Faustman & Omenn, supra note 104, at 88-90 (describing how
animal bioassay data is used in the hazard identification process).
109. See id. (discussing the limited utility of high-dose animal bioassays for determining
risks at lower exposure levels); see also Henning & Berman, supra note 96, at 31-32
(explaining that animal studies are of questionable value in proving causation in court
cases). See generally Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifin, Reference Guide on
Toxicology, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

401, 406-09 (2d ed. 2000) (describing the assumptions in extrapolating data from animal
studies to assess human health risks), available at http://www.fjc.gov (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review); Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology,
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are also frequently utilized to determine potential risks to human

health. ° But while these studies are preferable in that they involve
human exposures,' they are also subject to confounding exposures
and bias in study design.112 In addition, while epidemiology is
powerful for identifying association, it is substantially weaker at
establishing modes of toxic action or dose-response characteristics." 3
Plaintiffs that rely solely on epidemiologic studies are relegated to

arguing their claims in probabilistic language leading to mixed
results. 14

Frequently, the plaintiff will introduce a medical expert to
discuss scientific evidence supporting a particular theory of causation.
In addition to discussing relevant toxicological and epidemiological
studies, the medical expert may present the results of a differential
diagnosis, "a standard scientific technique of identifying the cause of
a medical problem by eliminating the likely causes until the most
probable one is isolated.""'5 A differential diagnosis typically involves
a physical examination, review of the patient's medical history, and
consideration of results from various clinical tests conducted on the
patient. 116 The medical professional will often discuss clinical
evidence of disease and any relevant toxicological or epidemiological
information that rules in the suspected agent as the cause of the
plaintiff's injury. The expert may also discuss evidence that rules out
other potential causes of the plaintiff's injury-an especially
important consideration when the suspected agent is not associated
with a signature disease.117 By ruling out other potential causal
factors, differential diagnosis has the potential to establish specific
causation.

in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 333, 345-47 (2d
ed. 2000) (discussing the disadvantages of animal toxicity studies for assessing human
health risks), availableat http://www.fjc.gov (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
110. See Faustman & Omenn, supra note 104, at 88.
111. See id.; see also Henning & Berman, supra note 96, at 31 (asserting that
epidemiological research is the "preferred method" for establishing a link between toxic
substances and human diseases).
112. See JASANOFF, supra note 98, at 120-21; Lora E. Fleming & Judy E. Bean,
Epidemiologic Issues in Occupational and Environmental Health, in PRINCIPLES OF
TOXICOLOGY: ENVIRONMENTAL AND INDUSTRIAL APPLICATIONS 511, 519-20 (Phillip
L. Williams et al. eds., 2000).
113. See Fleming & Bean, supra note 112, at 511-21.
114. See EGGEN, supra note 95, at 8.
115. Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 1999).
116. Id.
117. Perhaps the most obvious example of a signature disease is mesothelioma, a rare
form of lung cancer that is almost exclusively caused by exposure to asbestos.
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Admissibility of CausationEvidence in Toxic Tort Actions

Because of the need for expert medical testimony, nearly all toxic
tort cases require the court to make admissibility determinations on
causation evidence.' 18 The courts are ultimately responsible for
determining the admissibility of complex medical and scientific
evidence." 9 Today, there are two primary standards for admissibility
of expert testimony utilized by the courts: the Frye and Dauberttests.
The Frye test 120 requires that a scientific theory or methodology be
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. 2 ' Frye was
widely adopted by both federal and state courts 12 2 and is still utilized
in several states. 23 However, in the 1993 decision Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 24 the Supreme Court established that
judges should be the ultimate arbiters of the relevance and reliability
of scientific testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence.125 Thus,
the admissibility determination in federal courts was shifted from
acceptance by the relevant scientific community squarely back onto
the shoulders of the judge. 26 Although Daubert is not binding on the

118.
119.
at 31.
120.
121.

See EGGEN, supra note 95, at 10.
FED. R. EVID. 104(a); FED. R. EvID. 702; see Henning & Berman, supra note 96,
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Id. at 1014.

122. See EGGEN, supra note 95, at 271.

123. See Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of
Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453, 520-37 (2004)
(noting fifteen states and the District of Columbia follow the Frye test).
124. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
125. Id. at 589 ("[Tlhe trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.").
126. Under Daubert, the judge must ensure that the "reasoning and methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and ... properly can be applied to the facts
at issue." Id. at 592-93. Acceptance in the scientific community was retained as a factor
to consider, but lack of such acceptance was no longer a fatal defect in the proponent's
argument. Instead, a multitude of factors could be considered, including: (1) whether the
theory or technique has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer-review; (3) the known or potential rate of error for the theory or
technique; and finally, (4) the degree of acceptance of the theory or technique in the
scientific community. Id. at 593-94. The list is not exclusive, and consistent with guidance
from the Supreme Court, see Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999),
federal courts often consider other factors, including "(1) whether the expert has
unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion and (2)
whether an expert has accounted for obvious alternative explanations." Roche v. Lincoln
Prop. Co., 278 F. Supp. 2d 744, 749 (E.D. Va. 2003) (citing language from Supreme Court
and other federal court decisions), summary judgment granted, No. 02-1390-A, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 23353 (E.D. Va. July 25, 2003), vacated on other grounds, 373 F.3d 610 (4th
Cir. 2004).
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127
states, many state courts have adopted it.
As the causation element is a key component of the plaintiff's
12
case, defendants frequently launch pre-trial evidentiary challenges. 1
Often, the precise etiology of the disease at issue is subject to very
real debate, 2 9 resulting in completely contradictory expert testimony.
Thus, evidentiary decisions made by the courts are profoundly
challenging and have the potential to affect the outcome of a
particular case.
Not all courts have insisted on the same degree of certainty when
it comes to establishing causation in toxic tort cases. This variability
is especially evident in the courts' treatment of differential diagnosis
testimony. For example, while the prototypical claim involves
providing evidence of actual exposure levels, an absence of precise
knowledge on this point is not always fatal to the plaintiff's case. In
Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 130 the Fourth Circuit recognized
that it is often "difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the amount of
exposure" in cases involving exposure to toxic agents."' Similarly,
precise information about the threshold level of toxicity may be
absent. The Westberry court, permitting a worker's claim that he was
injured by exposure to airborne talc in the workplace, addressed the
absence of known hazardous exposure levels for the compound:

[W]hile precise information concerning the exposure necessary
to cause specific harm to humans and exact details pertaining to
the plaintiff's exposure are beneficial, such evidence is not
always available, or necessary, to demonstrate that a substance
is toxic to humans given substantial exposure and need not
invariably provide the basis for an expert's opinion on
causation.'3 2
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that in the absence of
precise data on exposure, the finder of fact may rely on a reliable
differential diagnosis that includes evidence of substantial exposure,
temporality of symptoms, and general notions of toxicity to determine
whether the plaintiff was exposed to unhealthy levels of a toxic

127. North Carolina courts recently declined to adopt the Daubert standard.
Howerton v. Arai Helmet Ltd., 358 N.C. 440,469, 597 S.E.2d 674,693 (2004).
128. EGGEN, supra note 95, at 270-71.

129. Id. at 7.
130. 178 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999).

131. Id. at 264.
132. Id. See generally Goldstein & Henifin, supra note 109, at 404-05 (discussing

causation issues and use of toxicological evidence in toxic tort cases).
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agent.'33
Other courts have scrutinized differential diagnosis evidence far
more strictly.

For example, in Moore v. Ashland Chemical,34 the

Fifth Circuit rejected testimony from a plaintiff's physician that
argued for a link between exposure to toluene and occupational lung
injuries.' The court refused to allow the plaintiff to rely solely on
evidence of the temporality of exposure and subsequent health
outcome, insisting on the need for scientific studies defining relevant
threshold levels of exposure.'36 Other circuits have applied a similar
logic, insisting that the plaintiff show "the levels of exposure that are
hazardous to human beings generally."' 37
Disparate standards of admissibility can have a profound effect
on the plaintiff's claim in a toxic tort lawsuit. If the toxicity of the
agent at issue is acknowledged, but the dose-response characteristics
are poorly defined, the fate of a plaintiff's personal injury claim may
be in question. Where, as with mold, the scientific evidence
supporting adverse health impacts is still developing and consists
primarily of clinical studies and small-scale epidemiological findings,
even compelling case-specific medical evidence may not be accepted
by the court as reliable evidence of specific causation. The outcome
may well depend significantly on that court's insistence on defining
the levels of exposure that are hazardous to human health.
IV. How THE COURTS HAVE DEALT WITH THE CAUSATION
QUESTION IN MOLD INJURY CLAIMS

The defense bar correctly considers the causation component the
weakest link in the mold plaintiff's personal injury claim. 3 In
addition to facing the standard litany of challenges inherent in any
toxic tort personal injury claim, the mold plaintiff faces several
uniquely difficult realities: mold is a ubiquitous, naturally occurring
organism, it exists in an astounding variety of species, and
133. See Westberry, 178 F.3d at 262.
134. 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998).
135. Id. at 279.
136. Id. at 278.
137. See Mitchell v. Gencorp, Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 781 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Wright
v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1105, 1106 (8th Cir. 1996)); accord Allen v.
Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Scientific knowledge of the
harmful level of exposure to a chemical, plus knowledge that the plaintiff was exposed to
such quantities, are minimal facts necessary to sustain the plaintiffs' burden in a toxic tort
case.").
138. See Julie S. Elmer, A Fungus Among Us: The New Epidemic of Mold Claims, 64
ALA. LAW. 109, 112 (2003) ("Causation is the Achilles heel of a mold claim.").
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environmental sampling methods are evolving rapidly, making results
from such surveys difficult to translate to actual human exposure.'39
In addition, surprisingly little is known about the impact of molds and
mycotoxins on human health, and even the well-characterized
symptoms of exposure, while real, are subjective and general in
nature. 4' Despite decades of study, particularly intensive during the
past several years, the scientific community has not reached any
consensus on the expected range of adverse health effects 14 1 or the
142
levels at which these adverse health effects might be observed.
Concurrent exposure to other indoor air pollutants such as bacteria,
cigarette smoke, volatile organic chemicals, and dust mites can
frustrate attempts to link specific symptoms to mold exposure. 43 Any
of the above factors can be mined by the defense to cause irreparable
damage to the plaintiff's case, particularly on the issue of specific
causation. 144 In many respects, it is hard to conceive of a more
challenging scenario for the toxic tort plaintiff.
A.

Existing Case Law

Despite the significant evidentiary challenges, plaintiffs have
prevailed in several mold-related personal injury lawsuits. CentexRooney Construction Co. v. Martin County 14 presaged many of the
issues that would be raised in future toxic mold lawsuits. Martin
County, Florida sued the construction management company in
charge of building the county courthouse, alleging that negligent
oversight of the project permitted window and exterior wall leaks to
139. See Kuhn & Ghannoum, supra note 20, at 146-47 (explaining the difficulties in
measuring toxigenic molds and the mycotoxins that are believed responsible for adverse
health effects).
140. See supra Part I.
141. See 1OM, supra note 18, at 253-54 (finding sufficient evidence of an association
between the presence of mold and several upper respiratory tract symptoms, but
inadequate or insufficient evidence to determine whether an association exists for other
health outcomes including asthma development, pulmonary hemorrhage in infants, skin
symptoms, and fatigue); Redd, supra note 22, at 60-61.
142. See IOM, supra note 18, at 92-93, 170 (emphasizing the poor understanding of
mold exposure patterns and concluding that the dose of mycotoxins required to cause
adverse human health effects has not been determined).
143. Kuhn & Ghannoum, supra note 20, at 145. See also IOM, supra note 18, at 90
("[T]he specific roles of infectious and noninfectious microorganisms and their
components in diseases related to indoor environments are poorly understood.").
144. See Stephen J. Henning & Daniel A. Berman, Mold Contamination: Liability and
Coverage Issues, 8 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 73 (2001) (distinguishing
general from specific causation in mold claims and defining causation as the weakest link
in the plaintiff's case).
145. 706 So. 2d 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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create an infestation of toxigenic mold. 146 The resulting "sick
building" conditions led to evacuation of the building.147 Appealing

the $14 million judgment against it, the construction company cited
several allegedly erroneous evidentiary determinations-namely, the

lower court's decision to exclude an environmental report showing
that fungal and bacterial levels inside the courthouse were two to ten
times lower than outside levels and to admit expert 48testimony

suggesting the existence of a health hazard in the building.

The Florida Court of Appeals agreed that denial of the

environmental report was an abuse of discretion, but found the error
to be harmless. 4 9 Significantly, the court affirmed the admission of

the health hazard testimony, finding sufficient foundation for the trial
court's conclusion, made following a Frye hearing, that the testimony
was admissible. 150 The court noted that both experts cited "numerous
publications" recognizing the adverse health effects of the toxigenic
molds, thereby providing adequate proof "that the basic underlying
principles of scientific evidence were sufficiently tested and accepted
15
Thus, Centex-Rooney
by the relevant scientific community.""

represents an early evidentiary victory for proponents of toxic mold
injury claims in a Frye jurisdiction, which is surprising given

subsequent statements by scientists and courts emphasizing the lack

of scientific consensus on toxic mold-related health effects. 52
Notably, no mention is made of the absence of known hazardous

exposure levels.
In New Haverford Partnershipv. Stroot,15 3 two apartment tenants
sued their landlord to recover for mold-related health problems
allegedly caused by the landlord's negligent failure to repair a leaky
bathroom fixture.'54 The landlord challenged the admission of expert
146. See id. at 23-25. The County filed suit against the construction managers,
masonry supply company, the project architect, and sureties involved in the project;
allegations included breach of contract and negligent design and construction. Id. at 24.
147. Id. at 24.
148. Id. at 25-26.
149. Id. (noting that the trial court permitted the defendants to present several of the
report's critical findings).
150. Id. at 26.
151. Id.
152. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text. Indeed, commentators discussing
defense strategies for mold litigants in Frye jurisdictions emphasize the lack of scientific
consensus on the causal relationship between mold exposure and adverse health
outcomes. See, e.g., Elmer, supra note 138, at 115 (discussing strategies for challenging
causation in mold claims brought in Alabama, a Frye jurisdiction).
153. 772 A.2d 792 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001).
154. See id. at 795-96 (describing the facts of the case). The facts in this case are
remarkable: a shower leak in the upstairs bathroom caused the plaintiff's ceiling to
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testimony relating to mold exposure and causation of plaintiff's
injuries, asserting, among other things, that one physician failed to
rule out other possible causes of plaintiff's cognitive deficits and that
none of the experts had a proper foundation to show causation. 151 On
the first argument the court upheld the decision to admit the
physician's conclusions with little discussion.156 On the issue of
causation, the court said the scarcity of monitoring data went to the
weight of the evidence but did not justify excluding the testing data,
while the medical testimony was properly based on the "scientifically
accepted" procedure of utilizing a medical history, blood test results,
and monitoring data to rule out other possible causes of the plaintiff's
injuries.'57 Thus, Stroot illustrates an instance of a court accepting a
mold personal injury claim on the basis of a differential diagnosis
analysis that did not include introduction of dose-response data,
consistent with the relaxed standard for differential diagnosis
employed by the Fourth Circuit in Westberry 5 8
159
Similarly, in Caldwell v. Curioni,
renters of a home that was
infested with mold including Stachybotrys prevailed on appeal of a
ruling granting summary judgment to their landlord. 6 ° At trial, the
plaintiffs' personal injury claims were rejected, despite expert
testimony concerning their health problems and the presence of
toxigenic mold in the residence. 6 ' The trial court may have been
swayed by one expert's admission that "there are no established
'
standards for permissible airborne fungal concentrations." 162
collapse, exposing debris "covered with black, green, orange and white mold." Id. at 796.
Despite a strong, nauseating odor, plaintiff remained in the apartment that night, but by
morning she could not breathe and was rushed to a hospital on doctor's orders. Id. It is
not clear from the court opinion whether the plaintiff alleged an adverse reaction to
toxigenic molds specifically. The opinion refers to "atypical" molds and the plaintiffs
symptoms included allergy-related respiratory symptoms and cognitive deficits. Id.
155. See id. at 798. The plaintiffs introduced testimony from at least four experts,
including a mycologist/microbiologist, two physicians and an architect. The physicians
both testified that the plaintiff's physical and mental ailments were caused by exposure to
"atypical" molds. See id. at 796-97.
156. Id. at 799 ("[The physician] took a history from [plaintiff] and relied on [another
physician's] review of her medical records. Since his approach is accepted in the scientific
community, we conclude that his opinion evidence was properly admitted.").
157. Id. at 800. Although the court referred to "acceptance in the scientific
community" as supporting admittance of the physician's testimony, its decision was
apparently based on the court's assessment of reliability. Delaware is a Daubert state.
M.G. Bancorporation v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513,522 (Del. 1999).
158. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
159. Caldwell v. Curioni, 125 S.W.3d 784, 788-89 (Tex. App. 2004).
160. Id. at 788-89.
161. Id. at 787-88.
162. Id. at 789.
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However, the absence of standards was treated summarily by the
Texas Court of Appeals, which declared that "the lack of any
established standards does not confirm that the levels of mold present
were not dangerous.' 16 3 The court found plaintiffs' evidence of mold
exposure and testimony from treating physicians compelling enough
to overturn the lower court's summary judgment ruling.1"
Not all personal injury claims have concluded favorably for mold
For example, Melinda Ballard's windfall
plaintiffs, however.
judgment of $32 million against her homeowner's insurance company
was tempered by a dismissal of her husband, Ronald Allison's
personal injury claims-a decision later upheld by the Texas Court of
Appeals. 65 Allison had offered evidence that toxigenic molds
including Stachybotrys were present in the couple's home, and
provided testimony from several medical professionals asserting that
exposure to these molds caused his illnesses. 66 Allison's experts
relied on an epidemiological study they had conducted in which
twenty people experienced a range of health effects after being
exposed to toxic mold in a building.167 But relying on that study to
show general causation proved fatal to Allison's claim. The district
court found that the study met the Daubert standard of
admissibility, 68 but fell short of Texas's Havner169 standard of
reliability for epidemiological evidence.17 ° Without sufficient proof of
general causation, Allison was precluded from demonstrating specific
causation.
Allison demonstrates a willingness of courts to keep a tight leash
on evidence supporting a mold plaintiff's injury claim. The court
concluded that testimony from the plaintiff's experts was based on the
results of an unreliable study, and as such, the testimony itself was
163. Id. at 793.
164. Id. at 794.
165. Allison v. Fire Ins. Exch., 98 S.W.3d 227, 237-40 (Tex. App. 2002). Mrs. Ballard's
victory was also tempered by the court's decision to reduce her damages to $4 million. Id.
at 264.
166. See id. at 239.
167. Id.
168. See id. The evidence was adjudged reliable under Daubert and the corresponding
state court case which adopted the reliability standard in Texas. See id. at 237-38
(discussing application of E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549
(Tex. 1995)).
169. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997).
170. See Allison, 98 S.W.3d at 239-40 (explaining that to be declared reliable, Havner
requires that an epidemiological study exhibit "a ninety-five percent confidence interval,
[or] ...show that exposure to the substance more than doubles the risk of injury" (quoting
Havner, 953 S.W.3d at 717-18, 722-23)).
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unreliable.'
Thus, reliance on a single epidemiological study of
questionable reliability fatally undermined the plaintiff's claim.
In Roche v. Lincoln Property Co.,172 two tenants allegedly

suffering from exposure to toxic mold sued their landlord and
apartment manager for negligent maintenance of their apartment.'73
In support of their claim, they offered the testimony of Dr. Bernstein,
an allergist that had treated them.'74 Dr. Bernstein concluded, based
on medical observations, a review of the scientific literature,
knowledge of mold measurements taken from the plaintiffs'
apartment, and his previous experience with patients suffering from
sick-building syndrome, 75 that the plaintiffs' symptoms were caused
by allergenic and mycotoxic effects of Stachybotrys and other indoor
molds.'76 The defendants moved to exclude Dr. Bernstein's testimony

as insufficient to meet the Daubert standard of admissibility on the
issue of specific causation.'77
The court ultimately concluded that Dr. Bernstein's testimony
was inadmissible under Daubert because he did not establish,
"through any acceptable methodology, that the plaintiffs were injured
78
by the mold allegedly contained within their apartment."'
Specifically, the court was unimpressed by Dr. Bernstein's "vague and
generalistic" conclusion that mold exposure caused the plaintiffs'
injuries,'79 his over-reliance on a temporal association,' 80 and his
reference to "conflicting facts. 1 8' In fact, the court spelled out no less
than ten reasons why Dr. Bernstein's differential diagnosis testimony
was deficient,"8 attacking everything from his lack of credentials as a
toxicologist to his failure to rule out the plaintiffs' "significant

171. Id. at 240.
172.

278 F. Supp. 2d 744 (E.D. Va. 2003), summary judgment granted, No. 02-1390-A,

2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23353 (E.D. Va. July 25, 2003), vacated on other grounds, 373 F.3d
610 (4th Cir. 2004).
173. Id. at 746.
174. See id. at 746 (reporting that symptoms included memory loss, sinus problems,
mild hypersensitivity to smells, chronic nasal stuffiness, chronic upper respiratory sinus
symptoms, chest congestion, and shortness of breath).
175. Id. at 749-50, 754 (noting that Dr. Bernstein reviewed blood tests, CAT scans,
MRIs, X-rays, and skin sensitivity tests on the Roches).
176. Id.at 746.
177. Id.at 747.
178. Id.at 750.
179. Id.(finding that Dr. Bernstein failed to distinguish between reactions to mold and
other common allergens).
180. Id. at 752.
181. Id. at 750 (criticizing Dr. Bernstein's reliance on equivocal scientific studies).
182. See id. at 751-52.
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Dr. Bernstein, the court concluded, failed to

"rule in the suspected molds and rule-out other allergens," making his
differential diagnosis insufficient as reliable evidence of specific
causation.1" Other recent decisions suggesting similar misgivings
about causation evidence in mold litigation are increasingly
185
prevalent.
B.

Should DifferentialDiagnosisPass Muster as Proof of Causation
in Toxic Mold Litigation?
The above cases expose a remarkable

range of attitudes

concerning the viability of differential diagnosis as proof of causation
in toxic tort litigation. Courts will rightly insist on a differential
diagnosis when a plaintiff's injury can be explained by more than one
cause.'86 Defining what constitutes a valid differential diagnosis,
however, is subject to significant dispute.187 And to date, courts have
exhibited widely divergent views on the matter.188 The sheer volume

of information included in a complex toxic tort differential diagnosis
provides ample opportunity to question the relevance or reliability of
proffered evidence. Similarly, the flexibility introduced by Daubert

permits significant leeway to courts that choose to insist on more or
higher quality data.'89
The Roche opinion provides an excellent point of comparison to

earlier toxic tort cases evaluating differential diagnosis testimony and
a possible window on how such evidence will fare in mold-related
lawsuits in federal courts. In many ways, Roche stands in stark

contrast to the Fourth Circuit's handling of the plaintiff's injury
claims in Westberry.19 ° The plaintiff in Westberry failed to bring forth
183. Id. at 752.
184. Id. at 753.
185. See, e.g., Graham v. Lautrec, Ltd., No. 01 031717 CE, 2003 WL 23512133 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. July 24, 2003) (granting a motion to exclude expert testimony on causation in a
mold personal injury claim).
186. See Joseph Sanders & Julie Machal-Fulks, The Admissibility of Differential
Diagnosis Testimony to Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: The Interplay of Adjective
and Substantive Law, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 107, 120 (Autumn 2001).
187. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Admissibility and Legal Sufficiency of Testimony
About Differential Diagnosis (Etiology): Of Under- and Over-Estimations, 56 BAYLOR L.
REV. 391, 395 (2004). See generally Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 186 (discussing
differential diagnosis options).
188. See Imwinkelried, supra note 187, at 395; Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 186,
at 120-29 (discussing numerous recent cases evaluating differential diagnoses).
189. Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 186, at 137 (concluding that overall, Daubert
courts are less likely to admit differential diagnosis testimony).
190. The courts' differing attitudes become stark in their description of the standard of
review under FED. R. EVID. 702. The Roche court emphasized the court's duty to keep
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any epidemiological studies, animal studies, laboratory data, or any
peer-reviewed published studies to support the medical conclusion

that his sinus disease was caused by occupational exposure to talc
dust.'91 In addition, his expert witness did not provide any tissue
samples indicating evidence of exposure, nor any evidence to show
that adverse effects would be experienced above the plaintiff's level
of exposure. 92 Yet the Westberry court upheld the decision to admit

the causation testimony, primarily on evidence of a temporal
relationship between exposure and effect.193 In contrast, the Roches

and Dr. Bernstein offered numerous exhibits in support of their94
claim, including tissue samples and an extensive literature review.

But the district court systematically eviscerated each of the plaintiffs'
exhibits, even finding occasion to attack Dr. Bernstein's status as an
allergist 95 and refusing to analyze his testimony as a treating
physician.196

Left with little more than a temporal association between
exposure and symptoms, the plaintiffs' evidence was deemed
insufficient proof of causation. 97 The court made the unnecessarily

broad statement that "[a medical] opinion based primarily, if not

solely, on temporal proximity does not meet Daubert standards."' 98

To distinguish Westberry, the court pointed to that case's testimony
from a treating physician, the prolonged period over which the

plaintiffs symptoms were monitored, and exposure to "severe" levels
of talc. 199 This explanation is deficient coming on the heels of the

court's broad statement concerning temporal proximity of exposure
and symptoms, especially given the awkward characterization of the
quality of the Roche plaintiffs' exposure evidence.2°°
out conjecture and unsupported speculation, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 748, while the Westberry
court spoke of the "flexible" inquiry to be conducted by the district court under the
"liberalize[d]" standard, which must focus on "principles and methodology" and not the
conclusions reached. See Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir.
1999).
191. Westberry, 178 F.3d at 262.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 265 (explaining that "depending on the circumstances, a temporal
relationship between exposure ...and ...symptoms can provide compelling evidence of
causation").
194. Roche, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 753-56.
195. Id. at 749.
196. Id. at 750.
197. Id. at 764-65.
198. Id. at 764.
199. Id. at 765.
200. See id. at 765 (dismissing expert testimony that the plaintiffs were exposed to
severe mold concentrations because "not all mold spores are allergens and not all molds

546
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Concededly, the plaintiffs' evidence in Roche was weak in several
respects. First, only one of the plaintiffs showed an allergic reaction
to mold when tested, yet both plaintiffs complained of suffering from
mold exposure.201 Second, medical tests showed the plaintiffs were
allergic to numerous allergens, and Dr. Bernstein's testimony failed
to rule out those allergens as potential intervening causes. 20 2 And
finally, as the district court willingly emphasized, the published
studies relied on by Dr. Bernstein contained language suggesting a
lack of understanding about the precise toxic mold exposure levels
associated with adverse health effects. °3
Understandably, all of the above factors augured against a
favorable outcome for the plaintiffs in their quest to demonstrate
specific causation. But the most legitimate flaw in the plaintiffs' case
was the failure to rule out confounding exposures. This failure is the
factor that most clearly distinguishes Westberry's facts from those in
Roche and will determine the outcome of evidentiary challenges in
future indoor mold personal injury claims. Although the plaintiff in
Westberry suffered from symptoms of a general nature and provided
little toxicological evidence to support his claim, he prevailed in part
because his treating physician took steps to rule out other potential
causes of the plaintiff's sinus condition, including a cold he had
suffered and a summer's worth of waterskiing. 2°4 The Westberry
court's discussion on this point was thin, which is remarkable
considering the generality of the sinus symptoms experienced by the
plaintiff.2 5 Perhaps it was the nature of the occupational exposure,
occurring in a more controlled environment than what might be
expected in the home, which swayed the Westberry court and
convinced it to overlook the minimal supporting toxicological
evidence. Regardless, because the plaintiffs in Roche exhibited
multiple allergic sensitivities, and perhaps more importantly, because
their allegedly mold-related symptoms were consistent with general
reactions to other airborne allergens, the failure to rule out
intervening causes for the plaintiff's ailments doomed their case. This
outcome was presaged by many commentators who follow mold
litigation," 6 and it strongly suggests that the "ruling out" component

produce mycotoxins").
201. Id. at 753.
202. Id. at 762-63.
203. Id. at 756.
204. Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 266 (4th Cir. 1999).
205. See id.
206. See Jarman-Felstiner, supra note 16, at 552; Perry, supra note 16, at 272-73.
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of a differential diagnosis
represents the most significant challenge to
20 7
the mold plaintiff.
C.

The Curious Role of "Standards"in the Causation Calculus

As the preceding paragraphs suggest, courts considering
differential diagnosis evidence in mold personal injury lawsuits will
have considerable opportunity to question the reliability of the
plaintiffs evidence introduced to rule out alternative causes of the
disease. Similarly, the evolving state of scientific consensus regarding
adverse health effects related to exposure of toxigenic mold will
further undermine proof of general and specific causation. Both of
these considerations were invoked by the Roche court in the course of
its evidentiary analysis and would have formed a defensible basis for
rejecting the plaintiff's causation evidence.
Rather than rein in its discussion to these basic, critical
considerations, however, the Roche court chose to engage in a
protracted discussion of additional, less relevant factors. It was here
that the court made its most questionable determinations. One
example was the Roche court's seeming obsession with "definable
standards" for molds. 20 8 The Roche court's logic was particularly
tortured on the issue of these mold "standards."
The court
repeatedly cited medical and scientific literature describing the
generality of symptoms arising from mold exposure and the nearly
indefinable range of exposures that would be expected in the
population,2 9 seemingly bolstering an argument that a single "bright
line" health standard for mold would be impossible to craft. But then
the court cited the absence of such a standard as a critical, fatal factor
in the plaintiffs' proof of specific causation. 10
The Roche court is not the lone voice calling for such healthbased standards; numerous authors reviewing the landscape of mold-

207. Of course, the plaintiffs in Stroot prevailed on essentially the same evidence, but
in state court. See New Haverford P'ship v. Stroot, 772 A.2d 792 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001).
Similarly, the state court in Centex-Rooney did not exhibit as much skepticism over the
quality of the plaintiff's causation data. See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text;
see also Caldwell v. Curioni, 125 S.W.3d 784, 794 (Tex. App. 2004) (reversing summary
judgment for mold defendant where plaintiff offered some evidence of mold exposure and

testimony from treating doctors).
208. Roche, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 756. The Roche Court discussed the need for exposure

guidelines or standards repeatedly over eight pages of the opinion. Id. at 754-61.
209. The court embarked on a lengthy review of the scientific and medical literature
pertaining to the health effects of mold exposure, quoting from articles offered by the
plaintiffs and the defendants. Id. at 755-61.
210. See id. at 761.
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related litigation have concluded that standards for mold exposure

are a key factor in the viability of such claims.21' The typical
argument is that until such standards are articulated, plaintiffs will not
be able to successfully establish specific causation because they will
not be able to show that their exposure exceeded some "safe"

threshold exposure level.2t 2 However, the courts do not speak with a
unified voice on the need for such exposure standards in toxic tort
cases.213 Numerous federal courts have insisted that the plaintiff
prove his actual exposure exceeded some quantifiable hazardous level
of exposure as part of the process of ruling in the suspected causative
agent in a differential diagnosis. 214 But other courts have been
215
considerably less troubled by the absence of such "standards.
The Roche court first broached the issue of "quantitative
standards or guidelines '216 for mold exposure in a section of its
opinion entitled "A Toxicologist's Methodology. ' 217 Toxicologists,

the court explained, must first establish the nature and extent of the
actual exposure. 218 They must then perform an evaluation, based on
the published scientific literature, of the exposure levels associated
with adverse health outcomes. 219 The final step of this risk assessment
211. See, e.g., Jarman-Felstiner, supra note 16, at 549 (asserting that "[u]ntil permissible
mold exposure limits" are established by governmental agencies, mold litigation will be
substantially hindered); Pefia-Alfaro, supra note 5, at 575-76 ("Until air quality standards
are implemented, much ... uncertainty and conjecture will continue."); Perry, supra note
16, at 297 ("[S]tate and federal guidelines for acceptable levels of mold within the home
are needed to help the scientific community, homeowners, insurers, and courts alike reach
definitive conclusions about the true dangers of mold exposure."); see also Wright & Irby,
supra note 5, at 323-25 (suggesting that an absence of permissible exposure limits and
remediation standards for mold presents a problem for environmental issues in the
transactional process).
212. See Roche, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 758; see also Graham v. Lautrec, Ltd., No. 01 031717
CE, 2003 WL 23512133, at *5 (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 24, 2003) (noting in dictum the conflict
in the scientific community over the ability to establish a "standard related to mold
exposure").
213. See supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 264 (4th Cir. 1999)
(allowing differential diagnosis despite a lack of "precise information concerning the
exposure necessary to cause specific harm"); Caldwell v. Curioni, 125 S.W.3d 784, 793
(Tex. App. 2004) (stating that lack of established standards for mold does not mean that
the mold present was not dangerous).
216. Roche, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 754.
217. See id. at 754-55. The court apparently felt compelled to embark on this
pedagogical exercise despite the fact that neither party raised the issue in multiple briefs.
Id. at 754.
218. Id. at 754 (quoting Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756, 764 (E.D. Va. 1995),
rev'd on other grounds, 100 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1996)).
219. Id.
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is to compare the two values to determine the relevance of the
subject's exposure. 220 Because the studies reviewed by the court
revealed that there were no "standards or guidelines" for mold, it
reasoned that Dr. Bernstein's anecdotal conclusions were
'
According to the court's
unsupported by "the methods of science."221
view, in the absence of an exposure guideline, the mold plaintiff will
almost certainly succumb to summary judgment for failure to provide
evidence of specific causation.
The court's enunciation of the principles of toxicology and its
subsequent dissection of scientific studies on the record are
admirable, but the court's analysis also exposes the danger of
permitting courts to march intrepidly into the scientific realm. The
description of the steps taken by toxicologists to assess risks from
exposure to toxic agents more or less accurately portrays the risk
characterization process described above.222 But the court risks
making a serious misstep when it delves into the "standards or
guidelines" supposedly used by toxicologists to assess risks. At one
point, the court explained that toxicologists use "exposure levels
associated with adverse health outcomes" as a barometer for
assessing risks. 2 3 This definition is consistent with the toxicity
assessment process described above.224 However, the court's repeated
reference to the absence of mold "standards or guidelines" risks
focusing on regulatory values rather than scientifically established
threshold exposure levels. To wit, the court discusses, at great length,
several articles offered by the defense which emphasize the absence
of definable standards for mold, none of which appears in the peerreviewed scientific literature.22 5 It appears from the language in these
articles and others discussed by the court22 6 that some of these authors

220. Id.
221. See id. at 754-55.
222. See supra notes 107-14.
223. See Roche, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 755.
224. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
225. Roche, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 755-58. Ironically, after the court explained that the
toxicologist methodology involves relying on published scientific articles, the court
dismissed as unhelpful peer-reviewed articles relied on by Dr. Bernstein and subsequently
focused the bulk of its discussion on articles that were not published in the peer-reviewed
scientific literature, including several government publications. See id. at 755-59.
226. The court also discussed an article from the New York City Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene as further support for its argument that no established standards exist
for mold exposure. The article, which is not published in the peer-reviewed scientific
literature, was cited by the plaintiffs but not relied upon by Dr. Bernstein. Id. at 758. The
court also referenced Internet publications and other state agency documents. See id. at
759.
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are referring to the absence of regulatory standards. 2 7
The relevance of the distinction between regulatory standards
and scientifically determined threshold effect levels cannot be

emphasized enough. Scientifically determined threshold effect levels
are based on empirical observations, often derived from closely
controlled animal experiments or peer-reviewed epidemiological
studies; 228 they are considered critical components of risk
assessment. 229

management

But regulatory standards are the result of risk

processes,

which

incorporate

significant

policy

considerations such as the notion of "acceptable" exposure levels.23 °

Regulatory standards are crafted to conform to statutory guidance
rather than causation principles. 3 The regulatory values are typically
far lower than documented effect levels, often by orders of
magnitude, because their role is to be protective of health.232 In
227. See id. at 754 (emphasizing that many of the cited articles discuss the absence of
"quantitative standards or guidelines for assessing whether the mold contamination in an
area is acceptable or not") (emphasis added); see also Graham v. Lautrec, Ltd., No. 01
031717 CE, 2003 WL 23512133, at *5 (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 24, 2003) (quoting Redd, supra
note 22, on the lack of information concerning "acceptable" levels of mold). Acceptability
is a common term used to define a regulatory aim. Cf Roche, 278 F. Supp. 2d, at 758-59
(quoting Redd, supra note 22, at 9-10 (referring to "setting standards and guidelines for
indoor mold exposure levels")).
228. Goldstein & Henifin, supra note 109, at 406-09 (describing various measures of
toxicological effect in animal studies, including the no-observable effect level ("NOEL")
and the maximum tolerated dose ("MTD")).
229. See generally THE PRESIDENTIAL/CONG. COMM'N ON RISK ASSESSMENT AND
RISK MGMT., 2 RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN REGULATORY
DECISION-MAKING (1997) [hereinafter PCRARM] (distinguishing between the risk

assessment and risk management steps in the development of regulatory standards and
guidelines), available at http://www.riskworld.com/Nreports/1997/risk-rpt/volume2/pdf/
v2epa.PDF (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also Douglas CrawfordBrown, Scientific Models of Human Health Risk Analysis in Legal and Policy Decisions, 64
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 63, 66 (Autumn 2001) (describing the series of steps involved
in risk assessment).
230. See PCRARM, supra note 229, at 55, 84-85.
231. Sutera v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 986 F. Supp. 655,664 (D. Mass. 1997).
232. See Crawford-Brown, supra note 229, at 78; see also STEPHEN BREYER,
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 42-50
(1993) (discussing regulators' use of conservative dose-response and exposure models in
justifying risk-based regulatory action). The EPA's reference doses ("RfD") and
reference concentrations ("RfC") illustrate the effect of safety or uncertainty factors on
final risk-based exposure guidelines. Both the RfC and RfD represent "[an estimate
(with uncertainty spanning perhaps an order of magnitude) of a[n] ... exposure to the
human population (including sensitive subgroups) that is likely to be without an
appreciable risk of deleterious effects during a lifetime." U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
Integrated Risk Information System: Glossary of IRIS Terms, at http://www.epa.govl
iris/gloss8.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
The recently derived RfC for chronic inhalation exposure to benzene (0.03 mg/m3 ) was
derived by dividing the lowest human exposure level associated with adverse effects (8.2
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addition, in developing exposure standards regulatory agencies are
not held to the same standard of proof as the plaintiff seeking to show
causation in a toxic tort action.233 The Roche court risks overstating
the relevance of exposure standards when it emphasizes the absence
of an indicator of acceptable levels of mold as a factor in the
plaintiff's failure to rule in Stachybotrys as a cause of his disease.23 4
Regulatory standards that purport to define acceptable levels of
exposure should play no more than a token role in the toxic tort
causation analysis. The Texas Court of Appeals was correct in
Caldwell when it stated that "the lack of any established standards
does not confirm that the levels of mold present [are] not
dangerous. '235 A party may well suffer injury from exposure to an
agent that has no regulatory exposure standard; 23 6 indeed, less than
one percent of chemicals in commercial use have been fully evaluated
for safety. 7 Similarly, an individual may experience an exposure
exceeding some acceptable regulatory level and suffer no ill effects,
due to the large safety and uncertainty factors incorporated into
health-protective regulatory standards. 238 Attaching significance to
mg/m3 ) by a composite uncertainty factor of 300. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, IntegratedRisk
Information System: Benzene (CASRN 71-43-2), at http://www.epa.gov/iris/subst/0276.htm
(last visited Nov. 17, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). This
uncertainty factor was compiled from separate uncertainty factors accounting for
extrapolation from an effect level to a no-effect level (3), variability in human sensitivity
to benzene (10), the use of a subchronic exposure study to derive a chronic exposure
guideline (3), and finally, an uncertainty factor to account for a lack of reproductive
toxicity studies (3). Id.
233. Sutera, 986 F. Supp. at 664; accord Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Assoc. Milk
Producers, 22 F. Supp. 2d 942, 961 (E.D. Ark. 1998) ("[R]egulatory agencies employ a
different perspective in setting 'action levels' than do the courts in imposing tort
liability.").
234. See, e.g., Roche v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 278 F. Supp. 2d 744, 758-59 (E.D. Va. 2003)
(claiming landlord negligently failed to maintain apartment), summary judgment granted,
No. 02-1390-A, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23353 (E.D. Va. July 25, 2003), vacated on other
grounds, 373 F.3d 610 (4th Cir. 2004). The court cited Dr. Redd of the CDC for the
proposition that because it is not known what indoor levels of mold are acceptable, setting
standards for mold exposure would be problematic. Id.
235. Caldwell v. Curioni, 125 S.W.3d 784,793 (Tex. App. 2004).
236. Data on actual injurious exposures often forms the scientific basis for exposure
standards developed to protect against future exposures. See Indus. Union Dep't, AFLCIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 617 (1980) (discussing the development of state
and federal workplace exposure limits for benzene following evidence of blood disorders
in workers exposed to benzene).
237. Goldstein & Henifin, supra note 109, at 412.
238. The aforementioned benzene RfC provides a capable example. See supra note
232. A person could conceivably be exposed to benzene at an exposure concentration one
hundred times the RfC value and yet still be well below the concentration associated with
adverse human health outcomes because of safety and uncertainty factors used to
calculate the RfC value.
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the presence or absence of acceptable mold exposure standards in the

causation analysis introduces far too great a risk for misstating the
merits of the plaintiff's evidence.
Although the absence of quantifiable threshold effect levels
ultimately plays little more than a pedantic role in the Roche court's
ultimate holding, its lax use of language to describe the toxicologist's

methodology risks putting far too much weight on risk managementbased regulatory standards where empirically-based values are
2 40
preferred. 3 9 This risk is particularly acute because several states

and the federal government24' have expressed a recent interest in
defining mold exposure guidelines.24 2

Proposed federal language

describing exposure standards does not hint at whether a risk
assessment outcome or a risk management-based exposure guideline
is being sought; 243 however, the language in California's Toxic Mold
Protection Act of 2001244 is far more suggestive of a risk management
goal. The Act charges the California Department of Health Services
to "adopt practical standards to assess the health threat posed by the
These
presence of mold ... in an indoor environment. 245
"assessment standards" are to protect the public health and are to be
239. Commentators, too, have succumbed to this temptation, suggesting that definitive
conclusions regarding health risks cannot be reached until exposure guidelines are
generated. See Perry, supra note 16, at 297.
240. For example, California recently enacted the Toxic Mold Protection Act of 2001,
2001 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 584 (Deering), on January 1, 2002.
241. Rep. John Conyers of Michigan is currently sponsoring a bill to address toxic
mold. See H.R. 1268, 108th Cong. (2003), http://thomas.loc.gov (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
242. There are currently no state or federal health-based standards for airborne
exposure to toxic molds, a fact cheered by some. See Ins. Journal, Mold LegislationSlows
to a Crawl in Statehouses Alliance Says, at http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/
newswire/national/2003/09/08/32047.htm (Sept. 8, 2003) (quoting Kirk Hansen, director of
Alliance of American Insurers: "We are happy to report that attempts to establish
exposure or air-quality standards at the state level have failed.") (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
243. The Conyers Bill directs the EPA to work with the CDC and NIH to jointly
establish "minimum levels of exposure at which indoor mold growth is harmful to human
health." H.R. 1268 § 102(a).
244. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 26100-26157 (Deering 2004).
245. Id. § 26105(a). Completion of these tasks will depend on establishment of the task
force and receipt of specific funding from the public. DHS has anticipated that if sufficient
funding is received, development of mold standards will take at least 2 years from the
point at which the task force is convened. See California Dept. of Health Servs., SB 732
(Toxic Mold Protection Act of 2001) Implementation Update, at http://www.dhs.ca.gov/
iaq/Mold/SB732update.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review). The Act also required the DHS to develop several additional mold-related
standards for mold sampling and remediation. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 26105 (Deering 2004).
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generated utilizing the latest scientific data, but these standards must
also consider technological and economic feasibility.24 6 Additionally,
the standards are to consider "the adverse health effects of exposure
to molds on the general population, including specific effects on
members of subgroups that comprise a meaningful portion of the
general population. '247 This directive thus seeks to incorporate
factors outside of the realm of toxicology, including considerations of
cost and technical feasibility.
Furthermore, consideration of
population subgroups of heightened sensitivity almost invariably
leads to the application of large safety or uncertainty factors,2 48 which
drives the exposure standard even further from the observed adverse
effect or no-effect level. Insisting that the plaintiff compare his actual
exposure to such a "standard" to prove specific causation would be a
dubious request at best.
CONCLUSION

Mold lawsuits continue to churn their way through the civil
justice system. Although the initial panic has subsided, great public
concern still exists over the impact of indoor molds on human health.
Several years have elapsed since the first toxic mold lawsuits entered
the litigation radar screen, and early results are mixed. Plaintiffs have
scored some substantial victories in personal injury lawsuits, primarily
at the state court level. Federal courts, to date, have been more
246. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 26105(b) (Deering 2004).
247. See id. § 26105(c) (specifying that subgroups comprising a meaningful portion of
the general population include "infants, children age 6 years and under, pregnant women,
the elderly, asthmatics, allergic individuals, immune compromised individuals, or other
subgroups that are identifiable as being at greater risk of adverse health effects than the
general population when exposed to molds.").
248. A recent example of a legislatively mandated safety factor can be found in the
"additional tenfold margin of safety" provision for protection of children from pesticide
residues, contained in the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110
Stat. 1489 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). The Act specifically
provides that:
The Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of Agriculture, in
consultation with the Administrator, shall conduct surveys to document dietary
exposure to pesticides among infants and children. In the case of threshold effects
...an additional tenfold margin of safety for the pesticide chemical residue and
other sources of exposure shall be applied for infants and children to take into
account potential pre- and post-natal toxicity and completeness of the data with
respect to exposure and the toxicity to infants and children.
21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C)(ii) (2000). Even without such a specific legislative mandate,
regulatory agencies regularly include safety factors for sensitive populations. See supra
note 232 (describing the inclusion of an uncertainty factor of 10 to account for variability
in human sensitivity to benzene).
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exacting in their treatment of causation evidence, refusing to apply
some of the more relaxed standards seen in earlier toxic tort cases.
This outcome is due in part to the generality of symptoms attributed
to mold exposure, which are difficult to distinguish from effects from
other common allergens. In some cases, the failure of federal courts
to allow causation evidence is also due to a lack of consensus about
the adverse effects from exposure to mycotoxins released by toxigenic
mold. But varying reactions to causation evidence are also due to
disparate views regarding the amount and quality of information
needed to constitute a reliable differential diagnosis. The prevalence
of mold, the generality of exposure symptoms, and uncertainties
regarding the ill effects of exposure to toxigenic molds will
undoubtedly continue to expose jurisdictional differences in the
treatment of differential diagnosis testimony.
As scientific understanding about the health effects of toxigenic
molds advances, the public is clamoring for exposure and remediation
standards for molds that will aid in defining the relevance of actual
exposures. The courts, too, have suggested that such standards are
necessary elements of the causation calculus. But great risks are
presented when decisionmakers rely too heavily on such standards.
Just as the absence of regulatory standards should not necessary
signal a fatal defect in the mold plaintiff's claim, so the existence of
standards will not necessarily be an appropriate guiding light for
courts grappling with issues of general and specific causation. There
are currently proposals at both the state and federal government level
that involve the development of mold exposure standards. However,
even if the science of mold toxicology has advanced to the point
where a foundation for such a risk assessment might exist, these
standards are likely to incorporate risk management concepts such as
technical feasibility and default use of safety factors that will give rise
to an end product that is quantitatively far removed from actual
health effect levels. Accordingly, the courts that so zealously pine for
such standards need to exercise extreme caution interpreting their
relevance in the context of causation. In the legal arena, the mold
"standard" may not be the panacea everyone seeks.
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